

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Signal and Imaging Sciences Conference, Center for Advanced Signal and Imaging Sciences (CASIS),
Engineering Directorate

Model-Based Algorithms for Detecting Cable Damage from Time Domain Reflectometry Measurements

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Auspices and Disclaimer

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We Have an Interdisciplinary Team

- **Graham Thomas - ENG/MMED**
 - **Project Management**
 - **NDE, materials characterization**
- **Chris Robbins - ENG/NSED**
 - **Program Management**
 - **Data acquisition, hardware, signal processing software, NDE**
- **Grace Clark - ENG/NSED**
 - **Image/signal processing, target/pattern recognition, sensor data fusion, NDE**
- **Katherine Wade - ENG/NSED**
 - **Signal processing software and testing**




Agenda

- **Introduction**
 - **The Cable Damage Detection Problem**
 - **This is work in progress**
- **Technical Approach - *Model-Based Damage Detection***
- **Damage Detection Processing Results**
 - **Real Measurements, Artificial Damage - *Not reported here***
 - **Real measurements, real damage**
 - **Performance Measurements**
 - ***ROC Curves, Confidence Intervals***
- **Discussion and Plans**




We Are Testing Two-Conductor Flat Cables With Kapton Insulation - For Dielectric Anomalies


Two-Conductor Flat Cable With Kapton Insulation



Foil Simulating a Capacitive Discontinuity (Damage)



Red TDR Signal => Good Cable
Black TDR Signal => Damaged Cable



Expected Damage Types:

- **Compressions**
- **Punctures**
- **Short Circuits**
- **Open Circuits**




The Technical Challenges/Issues are Difficult, But We Do Not Know Yet *Exactly How Difficult*

- We have access to only one end of the cable
- We cannot “Hi-Pot” the cables in place
- We have no exemplars of “real” damaged cables
 - We must “insult” them artificially
- We have no archive signals from the cables “As-Built”
 - Only a “typical” signal for an undamaged cable
- Small sample size
 - Small number of available cables for “insulting” (~ 60)
 - Obviates using supervised learning pattern recognition algorithms
 - Makes it difficult to create ensembles for building ROC curves
- Repeatability of Measurements (***A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE***)
 - Single cable - Test to test [*Apparently solved to first order*]
 - Cable to cable [*Under current investigation - OK to first order*]
- The signal shape changes significantly with the cable environment
 - We are building 2D and 3D “Mockups”



The Key Hardware Component is the *Pulse Inersion Unit (PIU)*

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Capacitive Coupling & Impedance Matching:

- **PIU = Half of "The Capacitor"**
- **Cable = Half of "The Capacitor"**



Our Focus is on *a Binary Detection Decision (Yes/No)*, NOT Failure Mode Classification or “Reliability”

Three Possible Hierarchical Decision Levels:

1. Detection:

- *Decide whether or not an abnormality in the cable TDR response exists (yes or no)*
- *Assume that an abnormal TDR response implies a flaw in the cable*

2. Flaw or Failure Mode Classification:

- *Classify the type of failure mode or flaw detected, from among a fixed set of possible modes*

3. Final Decision:

- *Using all of the information from the measurements and the previous two steps (fusion), decide whether the cable is “reliable or not reliable”*




The Model-Based Damage Detection Approach: *Detect a Model Mismatch if Damage is Present*

- Exploit the fact that the TDR measurements are reasonably repeatable.
- Build a forward model of the dynamic system (cable) for the case in which *NO DAMAGE* exists
- Whiteness Testing on the *Innovations (Errors)*:
Estimate the output of the actual system using measurements from a dynamic test.
 - If *no damage* exists, the model will match the measurements, so the “innovations” (errors) will be *statistically white*.
 - If a *damage* exists, the model will not match the measurements, so the “innovations” (errors) will *not be statistically white*.
- Weighted Sum Square Residuals (WSSR) Test:
The WSSR provides a single metric for the model mismatch



Step #1: System Identification to Estimate the Dynamic Model of the *Undamaged Cable*

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
System Identification:

- **Given:** $s(n)$ and $x_u(n)$
- **Estimate:** $\hat{h}_u(n)$
- **Test Innovations for whiteness**




Step1 (System ID) is Done “Offline”

Step2 (Damage Testing) is Done “Online”



Scalar WSSR is Calculated Using a Sliding Window Over the Innovations Sequence $e(n)$

WSSR = “Weighted Sum Squared Residuals”



$$\gamma(n) = \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n \frac{e^2(j)}{V(j)}, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

WSSR is a useful test statistic for detecting an abrupt change, or “jump” in the innovations

The Scalar WSSR Confidence Interval Threshold is Parameterized by *the Window Length W*

Summary of the WSSR Test for Significance $\alpha = .05$:

$$\gamma(n) = \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n \frac{e^2(j)}{V(j)}, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$V(n) = \frac{1}{W} \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n [e^2(j) - \bar{e}(j)]^2, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$\bar{e}(n) = \frac{1}{W} \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n e(j), \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$\tau = W + 1.96\sqrt{2W}$$

$$\text{If } \gamma(n) \begin{matrix} \geq H_1 \\ < H_0 \end{matrix} \tau, \quad (\tau = \text{Decision Threshold})$$

In practice, we implement the WSSR test as follows:

- Let F_E = Fraction of samples of $\gamma(n)$ that exceed the threshold
- If $F_E \leq \alpha$, Declare H_0 is true (innovations are white, no jump)
- If $F_E > \alpha$, Declare H_1 is true (innovations are not white, jump)



We Acquired an Ensemble of Real Signals for Processing


The PIU was never disconnected between acquisitions

Experiment E1: Data from 2_13_07

UNDAMAGED

Reference Signals (*Undamaged*):


refa, refb, refc



MINOR DAMAGE

Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife present, no short*):

minor1a, minor1b, minor1c




Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, no short*):

minor2a, minor2b, minor2c



Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, cable rubbed to remove short*):


minor3a, minor3b, minor3c



MAJOR DAMAGE

Major Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, conductors shorted*):

major1a, major1b, major1c




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Experiment 1: System Identification Results



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
System Identification: Preprocessed Signals




**Example:
Major
Damage**




System Identification: *The Model Fit is Good*




System Identification: *Correlation Tests are Satisfactory*



System Identification Whiteness Test Result = *White*



System Identification WSSR Test Result = *No Model Mismatch!*



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
Experiment 1:
“Minor3” Damage




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E1_xd_m3a_xuC.pdf


“Minor3 Damage”: *Damage Is Difficult to Distinguish Visually*



Minor3 Damage: *The Innovations are Small, But Correlated*




“Minor3 Damage” WSSR Result = *Model Mismatch!*



Minor3a,b,c Damage

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve = Perfect

W	P_{FA}	P_D
24	1	1
36	0.66667	1
48	0.66667	1
49	0.66667	1
50	0.66667	1
51	0.66667	1
52	0.66667	1
53	0.66667	1
54	0.66667	1
55	0.66667	1
56	0.33333	1
57	0.33333	1
58	0.33333	1
59	0.33333	1
60	0	1
61	0	1
62	0	0.66667
70	0	0
80	0	0



Conclusions & Future Work

- **The damage effects are somewhat distributed about the signal**
 - They are not necessarily localized in time/space
 - This gives *added value* to the model-based approach because it does not rely on localized damage effects
- **Tests with real data validate the algorithms**
 - **“Minor3” and “Major” Damage** give perfect ROC curves
 - **“Minor1” and “Minor2” Damage** give suboptimal ROC Curves

Future Work:

- Performance Tests using our **new Pulse Insertion Unit (PIU)**
- More repeatability studies:
 - Measurement-to-measurement for one cable
 - Cable-to-cable
- Cable “Insult Studies” with various types of damage
- Experiments in realistic cable environments - **2D Mockup, 3D Mockup**
- Build and test GUI’s
- Use algorithms with other applications



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
Contingency VG's




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Step #2: Compare the Responses of the Undamaged and Damaged Cables ==> *Damage Detection*

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
E1: “Undamaged” Signals Were Cut for Step1: System Identification



The “Damage Signals” Were Cut for *Step1: Damage Testing*


*Suboptimal Detection
Results for Minor1 and
Minor2 Damage*

Minor1a-c



xd_m1a.txt
xd_m1b.txt
xd_m1c.txt


Minor2a-c



xd_m2a.txt
xd_m2b.txt
xd_m2c.txt


*Perfect Detection
Results for Minor3 and
Major Damage*

Minor3a-c



xd_m3a.txt
xd_m3b.txt
xd_m3c.txt

Major1a-c



xd_MM1a.txt
xd_MM1b.txt
xd_MM1c.txt

*Processing Details for the Signals in Red
are shown in this presentation*




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Experiment 1:
Major Damage




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
“Major Damage” Signal Shows Obvious Damage



“Major Damage” Innovations Are Large and Correlated




“Major Damage” WSSR Test Result = Model Mismatch



Major Damage:

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve = *Perfect*

<i>W</i>	<i>P_{FA}</i>	<i>P_D</i>
24	1	1
36	0.66667	1
48	0.66667	1
49	0.66667	1
50	0.66667	1
51	0.66667	1
52	0.66667	1
53	0.66667	1
54	0.66667	1
55	0.66667	1
56	0.33333	1
57	0.33333	1
58	0.33333	1
59	0.33333	1
60	0	1
61	0	1
62	0	1
70	0	1
80	0	1



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Experiment 1:
***ROC Curves for Minor1, Minor2,
and All 12 Damage Signals***




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Minor1a,b,c Damage

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve

W	P_{FA}	P_D
24	1	1
36	1	0.66667
48	1	0.66667
49	1	0.66667
50	1	0.66667
55	1	0.66667
56	1	0.33333
57	1	0.33333
58	0	0.33333
59	0	0.33333
60	0	0
61	0	0
62	0	0
63	0	0
64	0	0
65	0	0
70	0	0
80	0	0

Probability of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm




Minor2a,b,c Damage

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve

W	P_{FA}	P_D
24	1	1
36	1	0.66667
48	1	0.66667
49	1	0.66667
50	1	0.66667
55	1	0.66667
56	1	0.33333
57	1	0.33333
58	0.66667	0.33333
59	0.33333	0.33333
60	0.33333	0
61	0	0
62	0	0
63	0	0
64	0	0
65	0	0
70	0	0
80	0	0

Probability of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm




All 12 Signals: Minor1a,b,c, Minor2a,b,c, Minor3a,b,c, Majora,b,c

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve

W	P_{FA}	P_D
24	1	1
36	1	0.66667
48	1	0.66667
49	1	0.66667
50	1	0.66667
55	1	0.66667
56	1	0.33333
57	1	0.33333
58	0.66667	0.33333
59	0.58333	0.33333
60	0.58333	0
61	0.5	0
62	0.41667	0
63	0.25	0
64	0.25	0
65	0.25	0
70	0.25	0
80	0.25	0

Probability of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm



P_{FA}

